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Abstract—With the rapid development of wireless Internet 
services, several WLAN service providers may coexist in one 
public hotspot to compete for the same group of customers, 
leading to an inevitable price competition. The charged price 
and the provisioned packet loss at each provider are major 
factors in determining users’ demands and behaviors, which in 
turn will affect providers’ revenue and social welfare.  
In this paper, we set up a novel game model to analyze a 
duopoly price competition. We first show the users’ demands 
are distributed between providers according to a Wardrop 
Equilibrium and then prove the existence of a Nash 
equilibrium on providers’ charged prices. Through analysis, 
we further find that in Nash equilibrium state the social 
welfare is very close to its maximal value in cooperative 
situation. Furthermore, the providers’ aggregate revenues also 
do not decrease when the users have high sensitivity about the 
charged prices. Thus the competitive duopoly WLAN market 
can still run in an efficient way even in the absence of complex 
regulation schemes. 
Keywords: Price competition; Price of anarchy; Wardrop 
equilibrium; Nash equilibrium; WLAN; hotspot. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Significant investments in broadband wireless networks 
are proliferating around the world in recent years, and have 
led to a highly competitive environment for wireless LAN 
(WLAN) service providers. They have to compete with each 
other and attract users in order to generate profits. In a 
typical competitive hotspot environment (e.g., a public 
cyber-café), several WLAN providers may coexist to 
provide wireless access services for the same group of users. 
In attempting to attract users and optimize their revenues, 
they need to price their services by taking into account a 
wide range of factors, including preferences of end-users, 
the quality-of-service (QoS) limitations of used technology, 
and the potential competition from other providers. 
Furthermore, when the QoS and prices are observed, 
wireless users will allocate their demands across the 
providers. This process will in turn affect the revenue of 
providers. Thus, with the capability to affect users’ demand 
and providers’ revenue, pricing in wireless networks has 
gained much attention recently [1]. 
Studying the impact of price competition is receiving 
increasing attention in the networking community. For 
general ideas on pricing, the reader is referred to [1]. The 
pricing game among wireless providers with fixed capacity 
is analyzed in [2], and it is shown that the price of anarchy 
(PoA) [3] is 1. Acemoglu et al. [4] study a pricing problem 
in which the users are sensitive to the price and a convex 
congestion delay, and give tight bounds on PoA. In [5] 
Hayrapetyan et al. gives an improved bound for the special 
case in which packet delay is a pure negative effect, which is 
linear or convex. Niyato et al. [6] investigate two levels of 
competitions in cognitive wireless mesh network, and 
propose game theoretic solutions to choose price and 
transmission rate for primary users and secondary users, but 
the demand distribution of secondary users is not analyzed. 
In [7] a cost-price mechanism based on users’ channel 
occupancy is proposed in WLAN to maximize the system 
throughput, but the competition between different WLAN 
providers is not analyzed. Furthermore, because WLAN 
standard employs a contention based random multiple 
access method based on CSMA/CA, i.e. DCF, as the 
fundamental MAC technique, there exists packet collision, 
which will result in packet loss. On the other hand, wireless 
transmission error may lead to packet loss too. Thus, in this 
paper, we consider packet loss rate (PLR) instead of delay or 
rate as negative externality [1], and find that it is indeed 
concave other than convex in WLAN environment. Thus the 
previous finding cannot be used in WLAN situations 
directly. To the best of our knowledge, the problem of 
pricing competition for WLAN providers with the 
consideration of price and PLR is relatively unexplored. 
In this paper, we focus on a duopoly competition, in which 
two WLAN providers compete for a same group of wireless 
users by adjusting the price charged. The provider’s aim is to 
maximize its own profit, while the users, driven by 
self-interests, rationally choose the service provider offering 
the best combination of QoS and price.  
We assume that users are sensitive to the experienced 
PLR as well as charged prices. The PLR at each access point 
(AP) occurs because of packets collision or packet 
transmission error. Generally, the users are more likely to 
connect to the provider with good channel condition and/or 
low price, but when more users connect to a provider, the 
probability of collision will increase too. This feature is also 
known as negative externality [1], since the decision made 
by a user will have a negative effect on the payoff of others 
connected to the same provider. Thus, it can affect user’s 
willingness to accept a provider’s service.  
Consequently, each user has to calculate the experienced 
cost to choose a provider according to the charged price and 
estimated PLR. We assume each user likes to choose the 
provider with the minimum experienced cost and the 
number of users (i.e., demand) decreases with the cost. This 
leads us to research some important questions: how the 
users’ demand is split among providers when their price 
strategies are given and the PLRs are estimated? Does there 
exist Nash equilibrium (NE) [9] price vector, under which 
no provider can unilaterally improve its own revenue by 
changing its price? Further, whether there exists the 
efficiency loss, i.e., PoA, as what is shown by many prior 
works, e.g., [4], [5]? 
To answer these questions, we first set up a game model to 
analyze negative externalities induced by PLR, give its 
approximation and find it is concave indeed. Then we 
characterize the Wardrop equilibrium (WE) [8] for the 
distribution of users’ demands. After that, we prove the 
existence of NE on providers’ charged prices. Then through 
numerical analysis we find that PoA can be close to 1.1, 
which indicates that the social welfare does not suffer too 
much in this competitive environment. Furthermore, we find 
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 that the competition does not lead to revenue loss when the 
users are very sensitive to charged prices.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We present 
the system model in Section II. Section III analyses the 
demand distribution in terms of WE. The pricing game is 
researched in Section IV. Section V gives numerical analysis 
of efficiency and we conclude in Section VI. 
II. MODEL 
A. Network model 
We consider an IEEE 802.11 hotspot area covered by 2 
APs, and let { }1,2Ω = be the set of APs.  Each AP i ∈Ω  is 
controlled by a distinct provider, which charges a 
price ip per user for using its service. Thus here the terms of 
AP and provider are interchangeable. We assume APs share 
the same frequency bandwidth in the network, whereas 
different APs are being operated on different frequency 
channels and using different PHY mode. Thus there is no 
interference among different users. DCF is used as MAC 
level multiuser access method. We also ignore hidden node 
problem, so that every user can sense all other’s 
transmission as in [10]. Furthermore we operate in saturation 
conditions, i.e., the transmission queue of each user is 
assumed to be always nonempty. And there is only one user 
that can transmit its packets successfully to the belonged AP 
at one time slot. 
Let ix be the number of users connected to AP i. Note that 
users are assumed to be infinitesimal, each of them having a 
negligible impact on others. We assume that when 
the thix user connects to the AP i, it will get a utility of ( )i iU x , 
which is its willingness to pay to get service. Similar to what 
is done in [4], we use the assumption that when a user 
decides to receive the WLAN access service, it will get a 
reservation preference of R, i.e. ( )i iU x R= . But a cost 
( )i ic x  will also be experienced when there are ix users, 
which is directly related with charged price ip and packet 
loss rate ( )i iPLR x . Furthermore, this user will not connect to 
AP i if the experienced cost exceeds its reservation 
preference. Then the aggregate user’s surplus in AP i can be  
( ( ))i i i iS R c x x= − ⋅  (1) 
where the cost ( )i ic x can be expressed as  
( ) ( ( )) ( )i i i i i i i i ic x p f PLR x p f x= + = +  (2) 
where ( )if ⋅ is used to express the experienced cost resulting 
from PLR. For the sake of simplicity, we assume users are 
homogeneous and let ( ) ( )i i i if x PLR xα= ⋅ , where 0α ≥ . 
The experienced cost is an important parameter since users’ 
demand and providers’ revenue are highly related to it.  
In this work, we define the revenue of provider i as 
( )i i i ip p xΠ = ⋅  (3) 
As defined in [4], the social welfare (SW) can be 
expressed by adding the utilities of all users and providers, 
i.e. 
( ( ))i i i
i
SW R f x x
∈Ω
= − ⋅∑  (4) 
B. Packet loss rate 
In 802.11 systems, PLR can be expressed as 
( ) 1 (1 )(1 )l c t c t c ti i i i i i i i iPLR x P P P P P P P= = − − − = + − ⋅  (5) 
where liP and 
c
iP are packet loss rate and packet collision 
rate experienced at AP i with ix users, respectively, and 
t
iP is 
the minimal packet transmission error rate supported by AP 
i.  
In fact, due to location-dependent characteristics, the 
transmission error rate will be different for different users. 
To focus on the price setting for different providers and ease 
the analysis, the exogenous information used in this game is 
the minimal transmission error rate tiP  that AP i can support 
under its geography situation and provisioned transmission 
techniques, e.g. coding and modulation. Furthermore, a user 
may also automatically move to a satisfactory place for an 
acceptable transmission condition. Then because there is no 
interference between providers in this model, we can assume 
that tiP at a particular provider is maintained as a constant 
value and different providers will support different tiP .  
In terms of packet collision rate ciP , here we refer to it as 
the packet collision observed at each individual user [10], i.e. 
it is the probability that one user encounters collisions when 
it transmits packets. Define 0iP as the transmission 
probability for each user. Then if ix users are connected to 
the provider i, we have 101 (1 ) ixci iP P
−
= − − . Since the 
providers want to maximize their profits, the assumption of 
maximum saturation throughput is reasonable in this 
research. In [10], an approximation for 0iP  under maximum 
achievable saturation throughput is given by 
*
0
* *
[ 2( 1)( 1)] / 1 1 1
( 1)( 1) / 2
i i c i
i
ii c i c
x x T x
P
x Kx T x T
+ − − −
= ≈ =
− −
 (6) 
where * / 2cK T= , and
*
cT is the average time when the 
channel is sensed busy by each station during a collision, 
which is determined as a constant by given PHY and MAC 
mechanism. Thus we have 
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(7) 
We can further yield 
( ) ( )
1
ln 1
l
i i i l
i i
x PLR P
P
υ
ω
−
= =
− +
 (8) 
where ( )1 ln 1 ti iPKω = − − , 21 12K Kυ = + . Remark that 
( )i iPLR x is strictly increasing with regard to ix and tiP . Also, 
since the second derivative '' ( ) 0i iPLR x < , it’s concave.  
III. DISTRIBUTION OF USERS’ DEMAND 
When a user wants to access to a WLAN, it will face 
several competitive providers with different charged prices 
and provisioned QoS, and therefore feels different 
experienced costs ( )i ic x . Naturally it prefers to choose the 
provider with the minimum cost ( )( )min i iC c x= . 
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 Furthermore, if a provider’s cost is too high, there will no 
additional user willing to choose it, and even already 
connected ones will be expected to switch. Then at 
equilibrium state, the experienced cost will be identical at all 
providers having a positive demand, or the number of users 
connected to one provider will be zero because of a too high 
access price. This is also known as Wardrop equilibrium 
(WE), which can be mathematically defined as follows. 
Definition 1: The users demand 1 2( , )
WEX x x= is said to 
achieve WE if  
( ( ) ) 0i i ix c x C i⋅ − = ∀ ∈Ω ,and ( )( )min ,i iiC C x∈Ω=  0ix >  
Also the total level of demand verifies ( )i
i
x X C
∈Ω
=∑ . 
This equation means that the providers with positive 
demand will have the same experienced cost C ; otherwise 
the provider will have zero demand due to the high cost. 
Since ( ) 0i ic x C− ≥ and ( )i
i
x X C
∈Ω
=∑ , the existence of WE 
in our model can be verified as that in [4], [8]. Next we will 
derive the uniqueness of WE in this research.  
We assume the total number of users in the system 
decreases with the minimum experienced cost. Then we can 
express the aggregate demand function ( )X C as  
( ) 0 , 0X C X d C for d= − ⋅ ≥  (9) 
where d is a demand parameter to express user’s sensitivity 
to the experienced cost. Then we can characterize the WE 
vector 1 2( , )
WEX x x= as follows. 
Proposition 1: With demand function ( )X C  and price 
vector 1 2( , )P p p= , WE vector 1 2( , )
WEX x x=  can be 
characterized as the smallest solution of the inequation 
( ) ( )i
i
X C x C
∈Ω
≤∑  with 1 0C [0, ( )]X X−∈ , and 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
0
1
0( ) 0
0 0
i
i
i i
i i i i
i
i
C p
X C PLR X
C p C p
x PLR PLR X PLR
C p
PLR
α
α α
α
−
−⎧ ≥⎪⎪
− −⎛ ⎞⎪
= > >⎨ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎪⎪
−
≤⎪⎩
 (10) 
Proof: Since in WE state, ( )i i iC p f x= + for 0ix∀ > , and 
the total demand limit is 0X , we have
1 i
i i
C p
x PLR
α
−
−⎛ ⎞
= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , 
when ( )0( ) 0ii iC pPLR X PLRα
−
> > . Otherwise when 
ip is too high, and ( )0i iC p PLRα
−
≤ , we can get 0ix = ; 
and when ip is too small, and all users want to connect with 
it, we have ( )ix X C= . Then we can get ( )ix C as the 
expression in (10). What’s more, after one user choose a 
provider, the minimum experienced 
cost min( ( ))i iC c x= increases and ( )X C  is decreased. 
If ( ) ( )i
i
X C x C>∑ , new user can enter the system to 
choose a provider; otherwise, the demand limit is reached, 
and the corresponding WE is achieved too.  ■ 
IV. PRICE COMPETITION ANALYSIS 
In this duopoly environment, each provider seeks to set its 
price in order to maximize its own revenue. Thus we set up a 
price game and the set of providers Ω represents the players. 
For provider { }1,2i ⊂ Ω = , its action is defined as the price 
choice ip .Then the action profile is denoted as the price 
vector 1 2( , )p p p= . Its utility is expressed by the 
revenue ( , )i i ip p−Π , where ip− denotes the prices chosen 
by providers else other than i. Then we define NE as 
Definition 2: A price vector ( )1 2,NE NE NEp p p=  is said to 
be a Nash equilibrium if for all i ∈Ω , 
( , ) ( , ) 0NE NE NEi i i i i i ip p p p p− −Π ≥ Π ∀ >  
We first prove a lemma that establishes some results with 
a price configuration p. 
Lemma 1: Assume that both providers have positive 
demand 1 2( , )x x x=  for price 1 2( , )p p p= . If provider i 
decreases its price to ni i ip p pε= − < , and jp for provider 
j i≠  is unchanged, where superscript “ n ” is used to refer 
the values corresponding to a new situation; then  
(1) the PLR increases to ,l n li iP P>  
(2) the least experienced cost decreases to nC C Cφ= − < , 
andφ ε< , where 0, 0φ ε> > . 
Proof: Since ni ip p< and
n
j jp p= , more users will switch 
from provider j to i. Thus ni ix x> and 
n
j jx x< .Since PLR is 
increasing related to user number, we have ,l n li iP P> . Then 
( )
( )
min( ( )) ( )
( )
n n n n n n
i i j j j j ji
j j j j j
C c x c x p f x
p f x c x C
∈Γ
= ≤ = +
< + = =
 
Let ni ip p ε= − and 
nC C φ= − , then we get 
( ) ( )
(1 ) ( )
( )
n
i i i i i i
n
i i i i
n n n n
i i i i i i
x x x
i
x x
C C p f x p f x
p e e e e e e
C e e e e C
υυ υ
ω ω ω
υυ
ω ω
φ ε
ε
ε ε
− − −
− −
= − = + = − +
= − + − ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅
= − + ⋅ − ⋅ > −
 
Thus φ ε< .            ■ 
With this observation, we can show the existence of NE. 
Proposition 2: When packet loss rate is much smaller than 1, 
there exists a price vector ( )1 2,NE NE NEP p p=  to achieve 
Nash equilibrium in this price competition. 
Proof: Without loss of generality, consider a possible 
change of provider 1 from 1
NEp to 1 1 1
n NE NEp p pε= − < . 
Then , ,l n l NEi iP P> ,  we can have 
( )
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1,
( )
ln 1
n NE n n NE NE
NE NE NE
l n
i i
p x p x
p p x
P
υ
ε
ω
Π − Π = ⋅ − ⋅
= − ⋅ − ⋅
+ −
 
Since , 1l niP ? , with Taylor expansion, we have 
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 1 1 1 1 1,
1 1 1,
1 1 1 1
( )
( )
( ) 0
n NE NE NE NE
l n
i i
NE NE NE
l NE
i i
NE NE NE NE
p p x
P
p p x
P
p x p x
υ
ε
ω
υ
ε
ω
ε
Π −Π ≈ − ⋅ − ⋅
−
< − ⋅ − ⋅
−
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With this price setting, no provider can improve its revenue 
by unilaterally changing its price, thus resulting in a NE.    ■ 
V. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS 
We investigate the efficiency of this game in terms of 
social welfare and providers’ revenue. Here we use PoA as a 
measure of the worst case difference between the social 
welfare of a cooperatively optimal solution (social optimum) 
and that in a non-cooperative NE state. Similar to that in [5], 
we define PoA as follows. 
Definition 4: If ( )1 2,S S SP p p=  is the price vector that 
maximizes social welfare, ( )1 2,NE NE NEP p p= is the price 
vector in NE state; then PoA is defined as ( )
( )
S
NE
SW PPoA
SW P
= . 
Since ( ) ( )S NESW P SW P≥ , we get 1PoA ≥ . When PoA 
is close to 1, it means the social welfare arrived at 
competitive environment is nearly as good as that reached 
through cooperative optimization. Whereas a large PoA 
means the competition is less efficient. 
In non-cooperative situation, we can first get NE price 
vector NEP by finding the intersection of both users’ best 
response functions as introduced in [9], and then find the 
corresponding WE distribution WEX  with Proposition 1. 
After that we can calculate ( )NESW P through NEP and 
WEX directly. While for ( )SSW P in cooperative situation, it 
can be found by solving the following optimization problem. 
( ) max ( ( ))S i i i
i
SW P R f x x
∈Γ
= − ⋅∑  (11) 
subject to: 
( ( ) ) 0i i i ix p f x C⋅ + − =  (I) 
( )i
i
x X C
∈Γ
≤∑  (II) 
where the constraint I means the solution should satisfy WE; 
and the constraint II  is used to constrain the user demand. 
Since the above problem has a continuous objective function 
and a compact constraint set, the existence of a social 
optimum is guaranteed.  
Based on above analysis, we can investigate the PoA 
through numerical methods with two APs that either 
compete or cooperate with each other, in which the total 
number of users 0X is 20 and R is 1. We also set K=9.334 as 
that in [10].  
In Figure 1, we show the best response under different set 
of prices. Both of the packet transmission error rates for 
these two providers are set to be 0.01, and demand parameter 
is 10. We find that there exist a unique NE at prices (0.4, 0.4). 
A similar result with NE at prices (0.32, 0.22) also exist in 
Figure 2, where 1 0.01
tP = and 2 0.03
tP = , and d = 3. These 
verify the existence of NE under different situations. 
Fig.3 and Fig.4 show the social welfare under different 
transmission error rate and demand parameter combinations. 
We can see that SW increases with demand parameter, while 
in NE state it is close to that in cooperative situations. From 
Fig.5 and Fig.6, the PoA is near 1.1. Then letting the 
providers compete with each other will yield almost the 
same social welfare as a global market regulator would have 
given. Thus this competition is not as inefficient as what we 
usually look in a non-cooperative situation. 
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Fig. 1: Best response function 1 2( 0.01, 10)
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Fig. 2: Best response function 1 2( 0.01, 0.03, 3)
t tP P d= = = . 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
Social welfare (Pt1=0.01 Pt2=0.01)
Demand parameter
So
ci
al
 w
e
lfa
re
Social Optimum
Social welfare in NE
 
Fig. 3: SW vs. Demand parameter 1 2( 0.01)
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Fig. 4: SW vs. Demand parameter 1 2( 0.01, 0.03)
t tP P= = . 
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Fig. 5: PoA vs. Demand parameter 1 2( 0.01)
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Fig. 7: Aggregate revenue vs. Demand parameter 
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Fig. 6: PoA vs. Demand parameter 1 2( 0.01, 0.03)
t tP P= = . 
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Fig. 8: Aggregate revenue vs. Demand parameter 
1 2( 0.01, 0.03)
t tP P= = .
Though the efficiency of SW is not decreased much under 
competition, the providers’ revenue in NE state is much 
smaller than that in cooperative situations when the demand 
parameter is small as shown in Fig.7 and Fig, 8. But when 
the demand parameter increases, the aggregate revenues in 
NE state will eventually approach to the cooperative 
maximal revenue. This is because the larger the demand 
parameter, the more sensitively that the user demand 
responds to the change of prices. If the user is not sensitive 
about the price, the providers would like to cooperate or 
even collude with each other to gain high revenue by setting 
high price. But when the user has higher price sensitivity, it 
will not receive any providers’ service at all if the charged 
prices are too high. Then the providers will be more rational 
and prefer to set relatively lower prices so as to attract users. 
Though the revenue is decreased with demand parameter, it 
will consequently be same as cooperative maximal revenue. 
Furthermore, as shown in Fig.3 and Fig.4, the social welfare 
also improves with the increasing of user’s price sensitivity. 
Usually the users are very sensitive to the price of wireless 
services, thus all entities including providers and users will 
not suffer from this competition. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, the impact of charged price and the 
provisioned PLR by different WLAN providers on users’ 
demand, providers’ revenue and social welfare in a duopoly 
environment is investigated. Based on a game-theoretic 
model, we first analyzed the negative externalities 
associated with PLR. Then we found the existence and 
uniqueness of a WE for users’ demand distribution between 
providers, and determined the existence of the NE of price 
competition. Furthermore, through numerical analysis, we 
showed that the social welfare will not suffer too much 
under price competition. Thus even without administrative 
enforcement, the competitive market itself can still 
determine the right price without degrading social welfare or 
even providers’ revenues, especially when the users are very 
sensitive to the price (In fact this is just the normal case for 
user’s attitude on price for wireless services). In the next 
step, we want to improve the system model and study this 
competition in a more realistic setting. Another interesting 
issue concerns the competition in a more general oligopoly 
environment, where there exist more than two competitive 
providers.  
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